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ARTICLE
UPDATING THE MEDICAL HEARSAY EXCEPTION:
MARYLAND SHOULD MODERNIZE ITS APPROACH TO
THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION
By: Amy Sevigny *
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a pediatrician employed by the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services. A six-year-old child victim of alleged
sexual abuse has been referred to you by a social worker. I When the
child comes to your office, you explain to the child that she is at your
office because there is a concern about her health due to an experience
that may have happened to her? You perform a complete ~hysical
examination of the child and order routine laboratory tests. Your
physical examination of the child reveals evidence of trauma and
penetration to the vagina and anus by a foreign object. 4 During the
examination, the child tells you that a particular person hurt her when
he put his penis in her "privates" and her "bottom" more than ten
times. 5
When the alleged perpetrator of the sexual abuse is put on trial, the
prosecution informs you that, based on how the Court of Special

4

B.S. Cornell University, Candidate for J.D. in May 2008, University of Baltimore School
of Law. Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Environmental Law at University of Baltimore
School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Lynn McLain.
See, e.g., Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 416, 705 A.2d 67, 69 (1998) (holding that the
prosecution's expert was only an examining physician and not a treating physician, thus
the guarantee of trustworthiness was not present, and therefore the pediatrician's
testimony to statements made by the child patient to her during a physical examination
did not fall under the medical diagnosis/treatment hearsay exception and was
inadmissible). This fact pattern is derived, in part, from the facts of Low.
The pediatrician's testimony that it was her habit to explain to her child-patients that they
were at her office because of concern about their health, following an unhappy
experience that might have happened to them, met the requirements of Maryland Rule 5406. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 422-23, 428, 705 A.2d at 72. The pediatrician's
testimony about this habit showed that the pediatrician had made such a statement to this
particular child. See 5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE - STATE AND FEDERAL §
406: 1 (2d ed. 200 I) (discussing how, under Maryland Rule 5-406, it must be shown that
the person had "an established, regular response to a repeated, specific situation" in order
for the hearsay evidence to be admissible as evidence of habit).
Low, 119 Md. App. at 421,705 A.2d at 71.
Jd. at 416,705 A.2d at 69.
Jd. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69.
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Appeals of Maryland has interpreted the Maryland Rules of Evidence,
your testimony about statements the child made to you during your
examination are inadmissible hearsay. Your testimony would not fall
within the hearsay exception of statements made by a person seeking
medical treatment "for purposes of medical treatment or medical
diagnosis in contemplation of treatment,,6 ("medical treatment hearsay
exception") and therefore you cannot testify to the child's statements. 7
The inadmissibility of this evidence as substantive evidence is the
sad reality for Maryland prosecutors, pediatricians, child sexual abuse
victims, and others who are trying to protect victims of child sexual
abuse. 8 The plain language of Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4) ("Md. Rule
5-803(b)(4)") is quite broad and includes statements made by a person
seeking treatment not only "for purposes of medical treatment" but
also for "medical diagnosis in contemplation ojtreatment.,,9 However,
Maryland courts have narrowly construed the rule's language lO which
was intended to codify the common law medical treatment exception
that "admit[ s] certain hearsay statements based on their inherent
trustworthiness."!!
Maryland courts have undertaken the
trustworthiness analysis in many cases involving the medical treatment

9
10

II

MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2007).
The child's statements to you may possibly be admitted for only the limited purpose of
giving the basis for your opinion and not for any substantive purpose. See MD. RULE 5703 (describing the limiting jury instruction and stating that upon request, the court must
instruct the jury to use those facts and data "'only for the purposes of evaluating the
validity and probative value of the expert's opinion or inference"'); 7 LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 165 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter "McLAIN RULES"]
(explaining that "[ u ]pon request, the court must give a limiting instruction to the jury that
those facts and data are admitted not as substantive evidence" but as non-substantive
evidence).
This evidence may also be inadmissible in a criminal case because it violates the
Confrontation Clause under the testimonial analysis. A discussion of the Confrontation
Clause in relation to the medical treatment hearsay exception is beyond the scope of this
paper. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (analyzing the
testimonial aspect of medical treatment statements made for the purpose of diagnosis);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 278, at 291 n.12 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006)
(explaining that Confrontation Clause issues may arise under the "testimonial" analysis);
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 600-01 (2005) (discussing the
scope and meaning of the testimonial concept).
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4) (emphasis added).
See infra part III.
David S. Gray, The Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception in Maryland: A Low Point in
Clarity for Practitioners and Protection for Litigants, 29 U. BALT. L. REv. 237, 244
(2000).
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hearsay exception. 12 The courts, however, have applied multiple,
conflicting standards that have created confusion. 13
To avoid this confusion, Maryland should adopt the modem
approach of the federal rules, and the rules of a vast majority of the
states, and extend the hearsay exception to patients' out-of-court
statements made to physicians, including those hired as expert
witnesses in preparation for litigation, "for the purposes of' medical
treatment or diagnosis.1 4 This would relieve the courts from making
nice distinctions between treating and non-treating physicians,
decrease the possibility of reversible error and retrial, avoid the need
for limiting instructions that could confuse jurors, and allow the factfinder to hear and weigh the credibility of all statements made for
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. 15
Part II of this article provides background on the rationale
underlying the common law medical treatment hearsay exception.
Part III gives a chronology of the Maryland common law and
describes how Maryland courts have applied the common law
rationale. Part IV describes the modem federal approach to the
medical treatment hearsay exception and gives examples of how the
approach has been applied in federal courts. Part V proposes that
Maryland amend Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) to mirror the fairer approach
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) ("FRE 803(4),,).16 Part V
12

13

14
15

16

See infra part Ill.
See infra part III. Compare Low, 119 Md. App. at 425-26, 705 A.2d at 73-74 (1998)
(holding that a pediatrician's testimony to statements made by a child sexual abuse
victim to the pediatrician did not fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception and
were therefore inadmissible because the pediatrician was only an examining physician
and not a treating physician which meant the guarantee of trustworthiness was not
present), with In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 34-36, 549 A.2d 27, 33-36 (1988)
(holding that a social worker's testimony to statements made by a child sexual abuse
victim to the social worker did fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception and
were therefore admissible because the child was almost five years old and her injuries
were internal and possibly indicative of the transmission of a "communicable disease"),
and Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 20, 30-34, 536 A.2d 666, 680-83 (1988) (holding that
a pediatrician's testimony to statements made by a child sexual abuse victim to the
pediatrician did not fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception and were
therefore inadmissible because the child was too young to have "a purposeful
motivation" to accurately describe her injuries in order to receive proper medical
treatment and therefore her statements lacked trustworthiness guarantees).
See infra part IV.
See infra part IV.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) and accompanying Advisory Committee's Note. The Advisory
Committee's Note states, in part:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not
within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only
for the purpose of enabling [the physician] to testify. While these statements

4
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concludes that the federal approach is fairer, more understandable, and
easier to administer than Maryland's current approach by applying the
medical treatment hearsay e'xception to all of a patient's statements
made to a physician that are relevant to medical diagnosis if the
statements are otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence and, in
criminal cases, admissible subject to the Confrontation Clause. 17
II. COMMON LAW RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE MEDICAL
TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION
Under common law, statements made by a person seeking medical
treatment to a physician for the purpose of receiving medical treatment
fall under a well-established and long-standing exception to the
hearsay rule. 18 Similar to most hearsay exceptions, admission of
statements made for the purpose of medical treatment is generally
based on trustworthiness. 19
Under common law, four types of statements have been included
under the medical treatment hearsay exception. 2o First, a patient's
statements to a physician about the patient's then existing bodily
condition are admissible under this hearsay exception because "there
are no problems with perception or memory.,,21 There is no perception

17

18

19

20
21

were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state
the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction
thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule
accordingly rejects the limitation.
FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
A discussion of the Confrontation Clause in relation to the medical treatment hearsay
exception is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 8, §
278, at 291 n.12 (explaining that Confrontation Clause issues may arise under the
"testimonial" analysis); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (analyzing
the testimonial aspect of medical treatment statements made for the purpose of
diagnosis); Mosteller, supra note 8, at 600-01 (2005) (discussing the scope and meaning
of the testimonial concept).
See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257, 257 (1989) (describing the common law
rationale of the medical treatment hearsay exception).
Gray, supra note 11, at 242-45. The common law is also based to a lesser degree on
necessity. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1420, 1421, 1423
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (describing necessity as when the declarant is
unavailable such as after a dying declaration or when evidence of equal value is not
available, such as under the excited utterance hearsay exception).
Gray, supra note 11, at 246-49.
6A LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE- STATE AND FEDERAL § 803(4):1, at 216 (2d ed.
2001); see Sellman v. Wheeler, 95 Md. 751, 754-55, 54 A. 512, 514 (1902) (physician's
testimony about patient's statements to him were admissible, despite the hearsay rule,
because the patient's statements were based on the patient's then existing physical
condition).
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problem because a patient is in the best position to perceive her own
physical sensations, and there is no memory problem because the
patient is describing her present physical condition. 22 Courts also find
these statements to be trustworthy based on the patient's belief "that
the effectiveness of the treatment depends on the accuracy of the
information provided to the doctor" by the patient. 23 Under common
law, the declarant's selfish interest in obtaining proper medical
treatment guarantees that the declarant's statement about her
symptoms is truthfu1. 24 Some statements of this type that fall under
the medical treatment hearsay exception may also fall under other
hearsay exceptions including the excited utterance exception, the
present sense impression exception, and the then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition exception. 25
Second, a patient's statements to a physician about the patient's
past symptoms are also now admissible under the medical treatment
hearsay exception. 26 Even though a memory problem exists when a
patient gives medical history to a physician by describing past
symptoms, it has been accepted that, similar to describing her then
existing bodily condition, the patient's desire to be truthful in order to
receive proper medical diagnosis and treatment outweighs any
memory problems. 27
Third, statements made by a patient to a physician about the
patient's medical history that do not describe past symptoms, but
rather, describe the cause or external source of a condition, also fall
22
23
24

25

26

27

McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(3):2, at 210.
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 277, at 284.
See McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 216-17 (noting that the patient's "desire to
receive a proper medical diagnosis and, thus, proper treatment, provides a strong
incentive for sincerity") (citing, e.g., Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120,
123-24,353 A.2d 263,265 (1976)).
Gray, supra note II, at 246-47 n.60. For example, if a person makes a statement to a
physician while the person is "under the stress" of a traumatic event, Maryland courts
will admit the statement under the excited utterance exception. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(2);
see also FED. R. EVID. 803(2). If a person makes a statement to a physician that describes
or explains an event or condition "while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter," Maryland courts will admit the statement under the
present sense impression exception. MD. RULE 5-803(b)(\); see alsq FED. R. EVlD.
803(1). In addition, if a person makes a statement to a physician that relates to the
person's "then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition" and is
offered to prove then existing condition or future action, Maryland courts will admit the
statement under the then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition exception.
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(3); see also FED. R. EVlD. 803(3).
Gray, supra note 11, at 247.
McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4): I, at 216-17.
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within this exception. 28 The statements must be "pathologically
germane" which means a person29 would reasonably believe that the
statement would have "sufficient bearing upon and relation to the
disease or injury from which one suffers. ,,30 The statement must be
particularly related to the medical condition for which the patient is
visiting the physician. 3) Again, the patient's desire to receive
appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment "provides a strong
incentive for sincerity.,,32 Many courts inquire further into the factual
circumstances underlying the patient's statement and if they find
apparent insincerity or improper motive, they exclude the evidence?3
Finally, only statements made in pursuit of treatment by a patient to
a treating physician qualify under the common law hearsay exception;
statements made to a non-treating physician do not qualify.34 Under
the common law, courts have held that statements made by patients to
non-treating physicians35 lack the trustworthiness guarantee that
underlies the exception because proper treatment does not "hinge on
such statements.,,36 Common law allows only treating physicians to
testify to prove the truth of out-of-court statements made by patients
28

29

30

31

32
33

34

35

36

Gray, supra note II, at 247. In certain situations, a physician may view the cause of a
medical condition as related to diagnosis and treatment while in other situations, such as
when establishing fault, "neither the patient nor the physician is likely to regard [the
statements] as related to diagnosis or treatment." MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 277, at
285.
The scope of the exception has been examined from the view of the patient as well as the
physician. See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 277, at 285 (discussing statements about the
cause of a condition or injury from the patient's and physician's point of view).
Marlow v. Cerino, 19 Md. App. 619, 635, 313 A.2d 505,514 (1974) (holding that out-ofcourt statements made by a patient to a physician about her alcoholism and schizophrenia
were sufficiently related to the illness for which she was admitted to the hospital to be
admissible under the hearsay exception).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278, at 286-87 (describing the test for admissibility to
be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" which is an objective standard).
McLAIN, supra note 2, § 803(4): I, at 217.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278, at 284-87 (describing the common law test for
admissibility of medical treatment hearsay evidence).
Gray, supra note II, at 248; see MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278 at 287 (describing how
courts were hesitant to admit statements made by patients to physicians who were hired
as expert witnesses for litigation because the trustworthiness guarantee did not exist).
Non-treating physicians include purely "examining" physicians who are consulted in
preparation for litigation. See Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 242-43, 220 A.2d 537,
541-42 (1966) (excluding testimony from an orthopedist who was hired by the patient's
employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier to provide orthopedic evaluation
and not treatment); Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d
715, 717 (1962) (excluding statements made by a patient to a physician about her
medical history because the physician was not employed by the patient to provide or
even recommend treatment).
Gray, supra note 11, at 248.
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about physical conditions in order to exclude the testimony of medical
experts who are hired by litigants to testify at tria1. 37
III. THE MARYLAND COMMON LAW APPROACH TO THE
MEDICAL TREATMENT HEARSA Y EXCEPTION
Over the last three decades, there has been a trend toward
abandoning the common law approach and adopting a broader
approach which allows the trier of fact to hear all statements made by
patients to physicians whether for the purpose of treatment or
diagnosis. 38 Only seven states, including Maryland, follow the
common law approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception. 39
Maryland's Rules of Evidence require that, in order for a patient's
statement to qualify under the medical treatment hearsay exception,
the statement must have been made "for purposes of medical treatment
or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.,,40 The rule
became effective in 1994 but it codified the long-standing Maryland
common law rule. 41 The rule distinguishes, then, between "treating"
and "non-treating" physicians on the ground that the patient's
underlying selfish motivation to receive proper medical treatment is
essential to the hearsay exception. 42 This distinction has provided
greater protection for insurance companies that must litigate actions
against dishonest policy holders or tort claimants who are feigning or
exaggerating injury. Unfortunately, however, this narrow approach
results in the denial of adequate protection to honest policy holders
and tort claimants, child abuse victims, and others who have suffered
serious injury. The case law construing this approach is conflicting,
requires confusing limiting instructions, and h-as resulted in the
unnecessary creation of reversible error. 43

37

38

39

40
41
42

43

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gray, supra note 11, at 253-56 n.I05 (noting that twenty-seven states have
adopted the federal rule, which broadens the common law approach).
Gray, supra note II, at 253-56 n.105. The seven states that follow the common law
approach include Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Tennessee. ld. Twenty-seven states have adopted the federal rule language
verbatim. ld. Ten states have "adopted the spirit" of the federal rule. ld. Six states have
made a distinction between treating and examining physicians. ld.
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4).
McLAIN RULES, supra note 7, § 3(c)(iii), at 217.
Gray, supra note 11, at 257.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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A. General Rule Under Pre-Codification Case Law

Prior to the adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland applied the restrictive common law approach to
the medical treatment hearsay rule. For example, in 1976, in Candella
v. Subsequent Injury Fund,44 the plaintiff, a hotel maid, had suffered
an electrical shock when she attempted to tum off the power on a
vacuum cleaner while she was working at the hote1. 45 The plaintiff
claimed she suffered from post-traumatic stress and sought worker's
compensation from her employer, its Insurer, and the Subsequent
Injury Fund. 46
The employee's attorney referred her to a psychiatrist who
examined, but did not treat, the employee. 47 The non-treating
psychiatrist testified as the employee's expert witness in the hearing
before the Worker's Compensation Commission (WCC), who decided
in favor of the employee. 48 On appeal, the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County granted the defendants' motion to strike the testimony
of the non-treating psychiatrist, reversed the decision of the trial court,
and entered judgment for the defendants. 49 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted a writ of certiorari prior to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland hearing the case and affirmed the trial court's
decision in favor of the employer, insurer, and Subsequent Injury
Fund. 5o
The Court of Appeals of Maryland applied the "universally
recognized principle that an attending physician may testify as to the
medical history related to him by his patient.,,51 The Court held that
testimony by the psychiatrist was inadmissible hearsay because the
psychiatrist was a non-treating physician. 52 The Court found the
psychiatrist was a non-treating physician because he did not render
"treatment of any kind," the plaintiff did not contemplate treatment by
44

45

46
47

48
49
50
51

52

277 Md. 120, 124-26, 353 A.2d at 264-67 (1976). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
acknowledged that "a number of states make a distinction which permits the nontreating
physician to present his conclusions," including the patient's medical history as the basis
for his conclusions, but not as substantive evidence. Jd. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. The
Court "declined, however, to adopt this view despite the criticism aimed at our own more
restrictive rule." Jd. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266.
Jd. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264.
Jd. at 121-22,353 A.2d at 264.
Jd. at 122,353 A.2d at 264.
Jd. at 121,353 A.2d at 264.
Jd. at 121, 353 A.2d at 264.
Jd. at 121-22,353 A.2d at 264.
Jd. at 123,353 A.2d at 265.
Jd. at 126,353 A.2d at 267.
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the psychiatrist, and the plaintiff "related the history to the psychiatrist
knowing that it was merely for the purpose of qualifying him as a'
witness on her behalf.,,53 Candella stated that the out-of-court
statements on which the psychiatrist based his conclusions "cannot
withstand the close scrutiny of hearsay testimony mandated by our
. d ..
pnor
eClSlOns. ,,54
B. Nonhearsay Limited Purpose Exception

In 1977, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted a new rule in
Beahm v. Shortall, which slightly loosened restrictions on the common
law medical treatment hearsay exception. 55 Defendant Beahm was
driving a tractor during the course of his employment with the
defendant, Atlantic Furniture Products Co. Inc. ("Atlantic"), when he
struck an automobile driven by the Plaintiff Shortall. 56 Shortall visited
a neurological surgeon the day after the accident because he suffered
from double vision, pain behind the left eye, and persistent headaches
following the accident. 57 Four years later, in preparation for litigation,
defendants hired Dr. Russo, a neurosurgeon, to examine Shortall. 58
Shortall related his subjective symptoms to Dr. Russo during the
examination. 59 Dr. Russo testified at trial on behalf of Shortall as to
Shortall's statements to him as they related to his conclusion that the
symptoms described by Shortall were disabling. 6o The trial court
found in favor of Shortall and the defendants appealed. 61 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland affinned the decision of the trial court. 62
In contrast to the Candella decision, Beahm concluded that a
physician who examined a patient solely to qualify as an expert, could
testify about the medical history63 statements the patient made to the

53

54
55

56
57
58
59

60
61
62

63

ld. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267.
ld. at 126,353 A.2d at 267.
279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977).
ld. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1009.
Jd. at 332, 368 A.2d at 1012.
Jd. at 328, 368-A.2d at 1009-10.
ld. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1010.
Jd. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1010.
ld. at 328, 368 A.2d at 1009.
ld. at 344, 368 A.2d at 1018.
The tenn "medical history" encompasses not only statements made by the patient about
"past events concerning the injury or illness" but also statements made by the patient "in
giving his symptoms, in describing his feelings or in complaining about the pain he
experienced." Jd. at 324 n.l, 368 A.2d at 1007 n.l; see Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234,
242, 220 A.2d 537, 541 (1966) (stating that what the Court has said about "medical
history" applies with equal force to "subjective symptoms").
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physician, as long as the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury.64
The instruction would have to explain to the jury that it was to
consider the patient's statements "as an explanation of the basis of the
physician's conclusions and not as proof of the truth of those
statements. ,,65 Based on the new rule announced by Beahm, the
statements in Candella would have been admissible for this
nonhearsay purpose with a limiting instruction.
C. Medical v. Social Disposition Distinction

If a limiting instruction requirement were not confusing enough, in
1988, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland further complicated
the understanding of the exception in contradictory decisions by two
different panels, in Cassidy v. State66 and In re Rachel T. 67 Both cases
involved two questions: (1) Do statements pertinent to psychological
or psychiatric diagnosis and treatment qualify under this hearsay
exception?;68 and (2) Is the identity of a sexual abuser or aggressor
pertinent to medical treatment?69 The court answered "no" to both of
these questions in Cassidy and answered "yes" to both of these
questions in In re Rachel T.70
In Cassidy, a two-year-old child abuse victim was brought to the
hospital by a representative of Child Protective Services three days
after the abuse and examined by Dr. Arnie Pullman. 7! During her
examination, Dr. Pullman observed numerous bruises on the girl's
arms, legs, and buttocks, and she saw signs of irritation to the girl's
genital area.72 During the examination, Dr. Pullman asked the little
64
65
66
67

68

69

70

71
72

Beahm, 279 Md. at 327,368 A.2d at 1009.
ld. at 327,368 A.2d at 1009.
Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666 (1988).
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988).
See MCLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 220 (citing Cassidy, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d
666; In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27); see generally John J. Capowski, An
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health Professionals Under the
Diagnosis or Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L. REV. 353 (1999) (arguing that
statements made to mental health professionals should qualify under the medical
treatment hearsay exception).
McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1 at 220 (citing Cassidy, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666;
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27).
MCLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 220 (citing Cassidy, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666;
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27).
Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668.
ld. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668. "Dr. Pullman also found significant the fact that the child,
instead of resisting examination of the vaginal area, took her hands and pulled her labia
apart. This, to her, indicated that the child had been sexually molested." Id. at 6, 536
A.2d at 668.
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girl approximately five times, "Who did this?" and each time, the child
answered "Daddy.,,73
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found that the out-ofcourt statements made by the child victim to Dr. Pullman did not
qualify for admission under the common law medical treatment
hearsay exception because the child's statements identifying her
abuser were not pertinent to her medical treatment. 74 Relying on the
common law philosophy, Cassidy stated that "[t]he doctrinal
predicate-the underlying reassurance of trustworthiness - upon
which this entire exception to the Hearsay Rule re.sts was ... entirely
lacking in this case.,,75 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
found that the two-year-old child victim was too young to understand
the purpose of her examination by Dr. Pullman and "appreciate the
critical cause-and-effect connections between accurate information,
correct medical diagnosis, and efficacious medical treatment." 76
Cassidy stated that "information about the cause or source of the
condition that would influence the course of treatment came under the
qualifying guarantee of trustworthiness" but that "other statements as
to causation that simply fixed fault or identified the culprit would not
come within the logic of the guarantee.,,77 Cassidy held that although
the identity of an abuser may be of "social importance," it is "not
ordinarily of strictly medical importance.,,78 Based on this reasoning,
the removal of a child from a home in order to prevent future abuse by
a member of the household is not considered as providing medical
treatment to the child.

73

74
75
76
77

78

ld. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668. For convenience, Cassidy treats the five repetitions of the
hearsay statement as a single instance and treats the combined question by the physician
and answer by the patient as one statement by the patient-"Daddy did this." ld. at 6,
536 A.2d at 668. The word "this" in Dr. Pullman's question to the child victim referred
to the bruises on her arms, legs, and buttocks. ld. at 7,536 A.2d at 669. The appellant in
this case cohabitated with the child's mother and, while they lived together, the child
referred to the appellant as "Daddy" even though the appellant was not the child's father.
ld. at 5, 536 A.2d at 668.
Jd. at 33-34, 536 A.2d at 682.
Jd. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680.
Jd. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680.
ld. at 27,536 A.2d at 678. The court made an exception to its assertion that the identity
of an abuser is "not ordinarily of strictly medical importance" by stating, in a footnote,
that "[w]hen there is a danger that an assault victim may have contracted a
communicable disease ... the identity of the assailant may take on significant medical
pertinence." ld. at 33-34 n.14, 536 A.2d at 682 n.l4.
Jd. at 33-34, 536 A.2d at 682.
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In re Rachel T.,79 on the other hand, found that the abuser's identity
was of medical importance and stated that "[a]scertaining the identity
of the [child] abuser was ... important ... because effective treatment
might have required Rachel's removal from the home."so In Rachel
T., an almost five-year-old child sexual abuse victim was referred to a
pediatric gynecologist by her pediatrician after the pediatrician
examined the child victim and found "a fresh tear in her hymen, a
significant amount of blood in the vaginal vault, and clotted blood in
Rachel's rectum."SI A female social worker who was part of the
pediatric gynecologist's teamS2 took Rachel's history and Rachel told
the social worker "that she had a secret with her Dad and that if she
told her Mom her father would be in big trouble."s3 After examining
Rachel, the pediatric ~ynecologist opined that Rachel was a victim of
ongoing sexual abuse. 4

79
80
81

82

83

84

77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988).
Id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35.
Id at 24, 549 A.2d at 29. The pediatrician also found "that her rectal sphincter muscle
was abnormally dilated" and that Rachel's "vaginal hymenal opening measured 15
millimeters, a serious abnormal finding because a measurement exceeding five
millimeters is considered to be significantly enlarged." Id. at 24,549 A.2d at 29. During
his examination of Rachel, the pediatrician also "found remarkable the relaxed ease with
which Rachel endured his examination." Id at 24,549 A.2d at 29.
Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 29. Rachel was treated at Chesapeake Clinic at the Francis Scott
Key Medical Center. Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 29. The clinic uses an interdisciplinary
approach where "a female social worker may be asked to interview a young female child
to gather a medical history, if the child seems to be uncomfortable with an adult male."
Id. at 25,549 A.2d at 29. Here, the pediatric gynecologist asked the female social worker
to take Rachel's history because Rachel was unwilling to talk to him. Id. at 25, 549 A.2d
at 30.
Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30.
Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. The pediatric gynecologist examined Rachel and "discovered
that Rachel's vaginal opening and hymen were extremely dilated, and the widest he had
seen in any child under the age of 10." Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. The physician also
"found diminished anal sphincter tone, which is a sign of sexual abuse if found in
conjunction with a gaping hymenal orifice." Id. at 25,549 A.2d at 30. A staff member of
the Department of Social Services of Maryland referred Rachel to Dr. Sweeney, a clinical
psychologist who specialized in child sexual abuse cases. Id. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30.
During Dr. Sweeney's examination:
Rachel took the male adult doll, pulled his pants down, showed Dr. Sweeney
the doll's penis and said, '[T]his is his tutor.' When asked if she had ever
seen a tutor, Rachel replied, 'Yes, my daddy's.' Rachel grabbed the male
doll's penis, put it in the female doll's genitalia and said, 'Tutor goes in here,
too.' Rachel named the female doll 'Cindy' and said that the male doll was
Cindy's daddy. She told Dr. Sweeney that Cindy's daddy had hurt Cindy by
putting his 'tutor' inside her. When asked to show what had happened, Rachel
depicted intercourse with the dolls.
Id. at 26, 549 A.2d at 30.
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The trial court, relying on Cassidy, excluded Rachel's statements to
the social worker and physician as inadmissible hearsay and ordered
that Rachel be returned to her parents because she was not in need of
court protection. 85 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland vacated the decision and remanded for proper
consideration. 86 It held that Rachel's statements to the social worker
and the physician fell under the medical treatment exception and were
admissible. 87 The court justified this decision by distinguishing
Rachel T. from Cassidy in two ways.88 First, the court found that fiveyear-old Rachel had higher "cognitive development" than the twoyear-old child victim in Cassidy and that Rachel's statements indicated
a higher "degree of sophistication" than the statements made by the
child in Cassidy. 89 Therefore, Rachel understood that her statements
to the physician would be used to provide her with appropriate
treatment. 90 Second, the court held that the identity of the abuser in
Rachel T was related to medical treatment because Rachel had
internal injuries, may have contracted a communicable disease, and
"effective treatment might have required Rachel's removal from the
home.,,91
The distinction that the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
makes between statements of medical versus social importance is,
understandably, confusing to the trial courts. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland weighs different factors in similar cases leaving
it unclear how the trial courts should rule on the admissibility of such
statements. This confusion causes unnecessary reversible error at the
trial level and increases the possibility of a retrial. Retrial creates
unnecessary additional litigation costs and inefficiency in our judicial
system.
D. Treating v. Non-treating Physician Distinction

Subsequent to Cassidy and Rachel T., in Low v. State,92 the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland further confused the case law in its

85
86
87

88

89
90
91
92

Id. at 27-28, 549 A.2d at 31.
Id. at 23, 549 A.2d at 29.
Id. at 35-36,549 A.2d at 34-35.
See MCLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 221 (explaining how the court distinguished
Rachel T. from Cassidy).
In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34.
Id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34.
Id. at 35-36, 549 A.2d at 35.
119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 67 (1998).
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"treating versus non-treating physician,,93 analysis. 94 In Low, a
twelve-year-old child sexual abuse victim was examined by a
pediatrician who was employed by the Montgomery County
Department of Health and Human Services. 95 The pediatrician found
that the child's "vagina and anus both showed evidence of trauma and
penetration by a foreign object.,,96 The pediatrician testified that the
child told her that "the perpetrator" hurt her when he "put his penis in
her vagina and in her 'butt' more than ten times.',97 The trial court
determined that the out-of-court statements made by the child to the
pediatrician fell under the medical treatment hearsay exception and
admitted the testimony of the pediatrician. 98 The defendant was
convicted and he appealed. 99
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction,
holding that the testimony by the pediatrician about the child's
statements did not fall under the medical treatment hearsay exception
because: (1) the pediatrician who was employed by the Montgomery
County Department of Public Health and Human Services examined
the child "for the sole purpose of examining and detecting child
abuse" on behalf of the prosecution; (00 and (2) there was insufficient
evidence to show that the twelve-year-old child's subjective intent
while being examined and interviewed by the pediatrician was "to
communicate potential ailments or abuse in hopes of further
treatment."(O( In a footnote, the Low court stated the following about
the age discrepancy between the child in Cassidy and the child in Low:
Although [the child victim in Low] was significantly older
than the child victim in Cassidy, given the facts in this case
we do not believe that a twelve-year-old child any more than
93

94

95

96
97
98
99
100
101

See supra notes 34-54 and accompanying text. This is a reference to the distinction made
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Candella between treating and non-treating
physicians. See Candella, 277 Md. 120,353 A.2d 263 (1976).
See McLAIN, supra note 2, § 803(4):1, at 223 (explaining that Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) does
not require that treatment actually be provided).
119 Md. App. at 416, 421, 705 A.2d at 69, 71; cf Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004) (analyzing questioning by a government agent in relation to the Confrontation
Clause). The Confrontation Clause analysis in Crawford relieves some of the pressure
that the Maryland appellate courts have felt to exclude medical treatment hearsay
statements especially when the statements were made to physicians hired by the
government.
Low, 119 Md. App. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69.
Id. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69.
Id. at 416-17,705 A.2d at 69.
Jd. at 416-17, 705 A.2d at 69.
Id. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73.
Jd. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73.
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a two-year-old child would have assumed that [the
pediatrician] was examining her for the purpose of
subsequent treatment. The age discrepancy in the two cases
presents no meaningful distinction for purposes of our
analysis. 102
This is a surprising statement by the court after it dedicated three
paragraphs in Cassidy to discussing "maturity," "cause-and-effect
connections," "conscious sophistication," and "purposeful motivation"
in relation to the age of the declarant. I 03
The Low court stated that it was "not entirely convinced by the
record that [the pediatrician] 'could have' provided" treatment to the
child victim. l04 However, the rule does not require that the physician
actually provide treatment. lOS The rule states that the statements need
only be made "for purposes of medical treatment" or for "medical
diagnosis in contemplation of treatment." I 06 Physicians first diagnose
a patient and then, if necessary, they treat the patient or refer the
patient to another physician for treatment. l07 Medical treatment
statements made by the patient to the physician during the diagnosis
step are no less reliable when the diagnosis happens to be a diagnosis
that does not require treatment. 108 As long as the patient "knows that
the diagnosis is intended to determine whether treatment is needed ...
the guarantee of sincerity is present.,,109
E. Additional Factors Considered When Determining Admissibility of
Statements

Most recently, in Coates v. State of Maryland,llo the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland added more factors to consider when
determining whether the medical treatment hearsay exception applies
to statements made by child sexual abuse victims to a treating medical
102

103
104

105

106
107

Jd. at 425 n.5, 705 A.2d at 69 n.5.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
Low, 119 Md. App. at 423, 705 A.2d at 72. Here, the child victim's laboratory and

examination results showed no infections or abnormalities and therefore it was not
necessary for the pediatrician to treat the child with medication or refer the child to
another physician. Jd. at 428-36, 705 A.2d at 75-78.
See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4) (stating that the statement by the patient to the physician need
only be made in contemplation of treatment).
/d. (emphasis added).
See McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):1, at 224 (describing how diagnosis without
treatment still falls under "in contemplation of treatment" found in the rule).

109

Jd.
Jd.

110

175 Md. App. 588,930 A.2d 1140 (2007).

108
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professional. III The court held that statements made by a seven-yearold sexual abuse victim to a pediatric nurse practitioner during a
medical examination were not admissible under the medical treatment
hearsay exception because (1) the nurse practitioner's ~uestions
"seemed to have an 'overarching investigatory purpose",;11 (2) the
child did not see the nurse rractitioner until "more than a year after the
end of the sexual abuse"; I 3 and (3) there was no indication that the
seven-year-old child understood that "she was at continued risk of
developing a latent, sexually transmitted disease or HIV.,,114
In Coates, the mother of Jazmyne, a child sexual abuse victim,
noticed that her daughter began to exhibit strange behavior in the fall
of 2003. 115 In November 2003, Jazmyne asked her mother: "'[C]an
little kids have babies?'" Her mother responded: '''No. Because if
they do, they'll die.",116 Upon hearing this from her mother, Jazmyne
began to scream for no apparent reason. ll7 The mother, Ms. Jenkins,
testified that this was when Jazmyne "revealed that she had sex with
[Coates]," Jenkins' former boyfriend whom Jenkins dated from spring
1999 until September 2002. 118 Jazmyne told her mother that she had
not told her mother about the abuse because "she was scared and
didn't want to.,,119 On November 14,2003, Ms. Jenkins took Jazmyne
to a medical facility where Jazmyne was examined by Heidi Bresee,

III
112

113
114
115

Id. at 627-28, 930 A.2d at 1163.
!d. at 627-29,930 A.2d at 1162-63 (quoting State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 91, 867 A.2d
314,330 (2005)).
Id. at 628-29,930 A.2d at 1163.
Id. at 628-29, 930 A.2d at 1163.
!d. at 598, 930 A.2d at 1146. The mother, Ms. Jenkins, recalled that,

while in the tub, Jazmyne would 'sit on the soap or run the hot water on her
body and just [exhibit] mannerisms that didn't seem normal for her.' In
addition, Jazmyne would put the back of her heel near her vagina and she
would just wiggle her ankle. Jenkins also observed Jazmyne insert the leg of a
Barbie doll into her vagina.

116

117
118

119

Id. at 598, 930 A.2d at 1146.
Id. at 598-99, 930 A.2d at 1146 (alteration in original). Ms. Jenkins testified that that the
child disclosed the information to her in November 2003, but a police report indicates
that the authorities were told of the accusations on October 24, 2003. ld. at 599 n.1 0, 930
A.2d at 1146 n.1 o.
Id. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146.
Id. at 599,930 A.2d at 1146 (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, Jazmyne told her
mother that Coates "'put [his] dingy inside of her coochie. ", Id. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146
(alteration in original).
Id. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146.
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who was a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) nurse and a
· .
..
120
pe dmtnc nurse practitIOner.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the nurse
practitioner's questions to Jazmyne about what had happened to her
had an "overarching investigatory purpose."121
The nurse
practitioner's questions elicited the identity of the abuser and did not
pertain to a medical purpose or Jazmyne's health needs. 122 The court
found that the identity of the abuser was of no concern for medical
treatment purposes because Jazmyne was not in contact with Coates,
no longer was in any immediate danger, and therefore would not need
to be removed from the home.123
In addition, the court "consider[ed] it significant that Jazmyne saw
[the nurse practitioner] more than a year after the end of the sexual
abuse, and at a time when she had no physical manifestations of illness
or injury.,,124 It is interesting, for several reasons, that the court found
this time lapse significant. First, child sexual abuse victims often cope
with the abuse by trying not to think about the abuse. 125 Sexual abuse,
especially of children, is often not disclosed by victims until some
time after the abuse has occurred when the victim is reminded of the
past traumatic experience and has an intense emotional reaction to a
present situation. 126 Second, the absence of an obvious physical injury
does not foreclose the possibility that the child was abused.127 The
short and long term effects of sexual abuse can include less obvious,
psychological symptoms such as anxiety, fear, nightmares and sleep
problems, acting out and general misbehavior, withdrawal, regression,
poor self-concept, depression, developmentally inappropriate sexual
behavior, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 128
Finally, the court found that Jazmyne did not have any
understanding "that she was at continued risk of developing a latent,
sexually transmitted disease or HIV.,,129 Most children do not have
120
121

122
123
124
125

126
127
128
129

ld. at 599, 930 A.2d at 1146.
ld. at 627,930 A.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 91, 867 A.2d 314,
330 (2005)).
ld. at 627, 930 A.2d at 1162.
See id. at 628, 930 A.2d at 1163.
Jd. at 628, 930 A.2d at 1163.
JOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICE 10
(2d ed. 1998).
Id. at 14.
See id. at 10-17
Jd.
Coates, 175 Md. App. at 628, 930 A.2d at 1163 (2007).
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this level of understanding. But, most children can understand that if
they are visiting a hospital, talking with a uniformed nurse
practitioner, and being examined in an examination room that the
nurse practitioner is generally providing them with medical treatment.
In Maryland, it follows, in order for her statements to the medical
professional to be admitted as evidence against her abuser, a sevenyear-old child sexual abuse victim must, at a minimum, (1) understand
that she has been sexually abused, (2) notify a responsible adult about
the abuse promptly after she is abused,130 (3) hope that the adult seeks
immediate medical treatment for her, (4) not reveal the identity of her
abuser during questioning by a medical professional unless she knows
it is important to prevent her continued exposure to the abuser, and (5)
comprehend that there is a medical purpose for the medical
examination. This is a lot to ask of a child sexual abuse victim. The
factors which were given weight by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland are understandable to lawyers and fit into nice, neat factor
categories in a judicial opinion but are unrealistic when applied to real
life situations like Coates.
Maryland's common law approach has caused its courts to struggle
with how to categorize statements made by patients to physicians
under Md. Rule 803(b)(4) because the common law rationale is
confusing and not conducive to drawing bright lines. l3l For example,
during a physician-patient relationship, a physician can assume
multiple, different roles along a continuum that may vary or go back
and forth between diagnosing and treating roles. In addition, in certain
circumstances, the physician-patient relationship never reaches the
treating phase on the physician role continuum because the patient is
seeking the physician's opinion in preparation for litigation or the
patient is simply not seeking treatment.
By relying on the common law approach to the medical treatment
hearsay exception, Maryland excludes, as substantive evidence,
statements made by patients to physicians hired for litigation
purposes. 132 The failure of Maryland trial courts to exclude such
statements has resulted in reversible error and costly and time130

131
I32

Cf MD. RULE 5-802.1 (d) (stating that "[a] statement that is one of prompt complaint of
sexually assaultive behavior to which the declarant was subjected if the statement is
consistent with the declarant's testimony" is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
statement was previously made by a witness who is now subject to cross-examination).
See supra part III.
See MCLAIN RULES, supra note 7, § 3(c)(iii), at 217; see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text (noting the rationale for the common law approach).
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consuming retrials. 133 In order to avoid reversible error and also
comply with the common law principles, Maryland's trial courts are
forced to be more conservative and decline to admit medical treatment
statements, even though they have sufficient indicia of reliability and
trustworthiness, simply because the statements were made to a nontreating physician.
Maryland's approach is underinclusive because it excludes reliable
and trustworthy statements made by patients to non-treating
physicians.
Maryland's common law approach to the medical
treatment hearsay exception does not allow the trier of fact to hear all
statements made by patients to physicians, whether treating or nontreating, and decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, if the
statements are reliable and trustworthy.
IV. THE MODERN FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE MEDICAL
TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION
The federal approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception
simplifies the trial procedure by obviating the need for limiting
instructions which are of doubtful utility134 and avoids
"overexclusion" by not distinguishing between treating and nontreating physicians. It makes it unnecessary for the trial court to
separate physical medical treatment from emotional medical
treatment; to establish different rules for internal versus external
injuries; or to divide the role of medical professionals into two
separate and distinct roles---one of social importance and one of
medical importance.
Under FRE 803(4), as under the Maryland rule, there are three
types of statements made by patients to physicians "for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment" that may be admitted as substantive
evidence: (1) "medical history"; (2) "past or present symptoms, pain,
or sensations"; and (3) "the inception or general character of the cause
or external source thereof.,,135 These three types of statements are
admissible if they are "reasonably pertinent to [either] diagnosis or
treatment." 136 Thus, FRE 803(4) changed prior law in two major
ways.137 First, FRE 803(4) "adopted an expansive approach by
133

\34
\35

136
137

See generally Coates, 175 Md. App. 588, 930 A.2d 1140; Low v. Stale, 119 Md. App.
413, 705 A.2d 67 (1998).
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 278, at 288.
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
FED. R. EVID. 803(4); United States v. Iron Shel\, 633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980).
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83.
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allowing statements concerning past symptoms and those which
related to the cause of the injury.,,138 Second, FRE 803(4) "abolished
the distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of
treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only.,,139
A. No Limited Purpose Exception

The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 803(4) discounts the
common law approach of giving limiting instructions to jurors with
regard to statements made by patients to physicians who have been
hired only for litigation purposes. 140 The Committee asserts that a
limiting instruction to a jury which requires the jury to use certain
evidence only to prove the basis of an expert witness' conclusion, and
not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is a distinction that is
"most unlikely to be made by juries.,,141
Although the limiting instruction that distinguishes the basis of an
expert's conclusion and the truth of the matter asserted may be
confusing for jurors, jurors are insightful in other ways. Jurors bring a
variety of experiences and points of reference to a jury. Armed with
these real-life experiences and common sense, a juror "is likely to
view with suspicion a patient-client's self-serving statements to a
'hired gun' expert witness.,,142 Under the federal approach, juries hear
the evidence, assess the credibility of the statements, and apply the
appropriate weight to the testimony in making its decision. The
federal approach is fairer, more understandable, and far easier to
administer than the Maryland common law approach as can be seen
from the case law applying the federal rule.
B. No Treating v. Non-treating Physician Distinction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
has been the leading circuit on this issue, clarified the federal approach

138
139
140

141
142

fd.
fd.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note (asserting that a limiting instruction

to a jury which requires the jury to use certain evidence only to prove the basis of an
expert witness' conclusion and not the truth of the matter asserted, is a distinction "most
unlikely to be made by juries"). At common law, statements made by a patient to a
treating physician may be admitted as substantive evidence while statements made by a
patient to a non-treating physician may only be admitted to explain the basis of the nontreating physician's conclusions. See supra part II.
FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
McLAIN, supra note 21, § 803(4):2, at 229.
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by applying a two-part test in 1980 in United States v. Iron Shell. 143 In
Iron Shell, a nine-year-old child victim of sexual abuse was examined
by a physician, Dr. Mark Hopkins, approximately two hours after the
alleged sexual assault. 144 During the medical examination, Dr.
Hopkins posed questions to the child, and the child answered them. 145
Dr. Hopkins testified at trial that the child told him that "she had
been drug into the bushes, that her clothes, jeans and underwear, were
removed and that the man had tried to force something into her vagina
which hurt.,,146 Dr. Hopkins testified further that the child told him
that she had tried to scream for help but couldn't because "the man put
his hand over her mouth and neck.,,147 Dr. Hopkins' physical
examination of the child revealed that there was "a small amount of
sand and grass in the perineal area but not in the vagina," the child had
"superficial abrasions on both sides of [her] neck," and there was "no
physical evidence of penetration, the hymen was intact and no spenn
was located.,,148 The defendant was convicted of assault with the
intent to commit rape and he appealed. 149
The court of appeals found that the child's statements to Dr.
Hopkins fell primarily within the "inception or general character of the
cause" category ofFRE 803(4).150 The court held that the child had a
strong motive to tell the truth and her statements were "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" and were therefore admissible
under this hearsay exception. 151 Thus, the court developed a two-part
test based on the common law rationale and on a reasonableness
standard to help it apply FRE 803(4).152
The first part of the test considers whether the patient's motive is
"consistent with the purpose of the rule.,,153 This step focuses on the
subjective intent of the patient and relies on a patient's strong motive
to tell the truth to a physician because the patient wants to receive
143
144

145
146
147
148
149

150

151
152
153

633 F.2d at 84-85.
See id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
!d. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 80. The defendant raised ten different issues on appeal. Id. at 82. This article
addresses only one of the ten issues-the admission of statements made by the child to
Dr. Hopkins during his examination of the child. Id.
See id. at 83 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (setting out the requirements for admission of
statements under the medical treatment hearsay exception)).
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
Id.
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proper diagnosis or treatment. 154 The purpose of the physician's
examination was to diagnose the child, treat the child, if necessary,
and preserve any evidence. 155 The child's statements concerned "what
happened rather than who assaulted her" and "were related to her
physical condition," and therefore, the statements "were pertinent to
diagnosis and treatment" and fell "within the scope of the rule.,,156
The second step of the test considers whether it is "reasonable for
the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.,,157
This step is different from the first step in that it is an objective,
instead of subjective, analysis. It is also different in that it focuses on
the reliance of the physician, instead of on the trustworthiness of the
patient. The court held that Dr. Hopkins reasonably relied on the
child's statements in order to properly diagnose and treat the child and
therefore the statements also satisfied the second part of the test. 158

Iron Shell analogizes the second part of the test to the ~rinciple
underlying the Federal Rule of Evidence 703 ("FRE 703,,).15 Under
FRE 703, underlying facts or data need not be admissible in order for
an expert opinion to be admitted as long as the facts or data are "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions.,,16o The corollary part of the Iron Shell test
"recognizes that life and death decisions are made by physicians in
reliance" on statements made by patients that are pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment and therefore those statements should have "sufficient
trustworthiness to be admissible in a court oflaw.,,161 If the statement
is trustworthy enough for a doctor to use it in making life and death
decisions about medical diagnosis or treatment, it is trustworthy
enough for a court to admit it as substantive evidence at trial. 162
154

155
156
157
158

159

160
161
162

/d. (citing Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940) (describing how
a patient has a motive to speak the truth when the patient speaks to the physician about
present and/or past symptoms because the information is important to the patient's
treatment); see supra part II.
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84-85. Dr. Hopkins testified that a "discussion of the cause of the injury was
important to provide guidelines for his examination by pinpointing areas of the body to
be examined more closely and by narrowing his examination by eliminating other areas."
Id. at 84.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84.
Id. However, FRE 703 was amended in 2000 and the "new language tips more against
admissibility" for the limited nonhearsay purpose than the pre-2000 language did.
McLAIN RULES, supra note 7, § 3, at 166 (emphasis added). The 2000 amendment to
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The Eighth Circuit applied the Iron Shell two-part test in United
States v. Renville. 163 In Renville, an eleven-year-old child sexual
abuse victim was examined by a family practice physician, Dr. Clark
Likness, after the child's stepfather alleged sexually abused her. 164 Dr.
Likness testified that the child told him that her stepfather had had anal
intercourse with her and performed cunnilingus on her. 165 The jury
found Renville guilty and he appealed. 166 The court of appeals held
that the statements by the child to the physician passed the two-part
test from Iron Shell and were therefore admissible. 167 First, the child's
motive in making the statement was consistent with the purposes of
promoting treatment. 168 Second, the content of the statement was such
as is reasonably relied upon by a physician in treating or diagnosing a
patient. 169
The court focused on the second part of the test in its analysis in
order to understand if the identity of the abuser was reasonably
pertinent to treatment. 170 Although Iron Shell did not involve a
statement that identified an abuser, Iron Shell had cautioned that the
defendant's identity "would seldom, if ever" be reasonably pertinent to
FRE 703 might weaken the parallel made in Iron Shell, but it does not weaken the
rationale of Iron Shell's two-part test or the federal approach. The pre-2000 FRE 703
stated:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
McLAIN RULES, supra note 7, at 357.

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

The 2000 amendment added: "Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." FED. R. EVID. 703. The current FRE 703
is intended to cover "facts or data that cannot be admitted for any purpose other than to
assist the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion." FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's
note. This intention "provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information
used as the basis of an expert's opinion and not admissible for any substantive purpose."
!d.
779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
ld. at 432.
ld.
ld. at 43l.
!d. at 439.
ld. at 436.
See id.
ld. at 436-39.
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treatment or diagnosis. 17I The Renville court reasoned that one of the
"seldom" times that the identity of an abuser might be reasonably
pertinent to treatment is when a child makes a statement to a physician
that identifies her abuser as someone who is a member of the child's
l72
household.
In this situation, the identity of the sexual abuser is
imperative to proper treatment of the child because the "exact nature
and extent of the psychological problems that ensue from child abuse
often depend on the identity of the abuser.,,173
V. MARYLAND SHOULD ADOPT THE FEDERAL APPROACH
Maryland's common law approach to the medical treatment hearsay
exception is outdated and is causing confusion in Maryland courts. 174
The federal approach allows jurors to hear statements made by patients
to physicians for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment, no matter if the
physician is a treating or non-treating physician. 175 The jury can then
assess the appropriate weight to the credibility ofthose statements. 176

171

172
173

174

175
176

Id. at 436 (quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also
United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979). Iron Shell relied partly
on the Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 803(4) that gave an example that "a patient's
statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that
the car was driven through a red light." FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note;
see also United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 289 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (statement by
a patient to a physician that he was shot is admissible but a statement that he was shot by
a white man is not admissible because the shooter's skin color is not pertinent to medical
treatment or diagnosis). Statements concerning the identity of a sexual abuser are
different from statements about a car running through a red light or a white man shooting
someone. In child sexual abuse cases, the identity of the abuser is critical to proper
treatment of the child, whereas the identity of the defendant or of who was at fault in an
accident has nothing to do with treatment. Id.
Renville, 779 F.2d at 436-37.
Id. at 437. Dr. Likness testified that '''there is an ongoing emotional trauma, and an
emotional trauma that is sometimes extremely hard to define, but it shows up and affects
all of those people that have been abused in some way or form. ", /d. at n.11. He stated
that emotional trauma is something that does not "'necessarily show up in a physical
exam, but are definitely important in the well being of this child.'" Id. Dr. Likness
further testified that understanding emotional trauma helps him understand "'how I then
will be able to take care of her in the future, what type of sexual care does she need
medically, psychiatrically, and how is it going to affect her life. ", Id. In addition, he
testified that the identity of the abuser is "extremely important" for the purpose of
diagnosis and treatment of the child. Id. at n.12. He stated that if the abuser is someone
that is close to the child-"'someone who she lives with, someone who she spends time
with and if she can tell [him1that there have been several'" ongoing incidents of abuse,
then the chances of that abuse continuing is "'very, very high.'" Id.
See supra part III.
See supra part IV.
See supra part IV. A.
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Juries are insightful when it comes to distinguishing between a
patient's interest in receiving proper medical diagnosis and treatment
and a patient's interest in enhancing symptoms to get a larger damage
award. 177 Maryland does not need to follow a confusing common law
approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception to "weed out"
money hungry plaintiffs looking to win big from employers and
insurers. Juries can do that very effectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Maryland's common law approach to the medical treatment
hearsay exception, Maryland juries are not given the opportunity to
hear and evaluate whether to rely on statements made by patients to
physicians, unless those statements fit into a very narrow and
underinc1usive category. Maryland case law applying the common
law approach to the medical treatment hearsay exception is unduly
complicated and confusing. The federal approach to the medical
treatment hearsay exception is fairer and easier for trial courts to
apply. The federal approach does not require the trial court to separate
physical medical treatment from emotional medical treatment, to
establish different rules for internal versus external injuries, or to
divide the roles of medical professionals into two separate and distinct
roles. Maryland should therefore adopt the federal approach to the
medical treatment hearsay exception and allow the jury to weigh the
credibility of statements made by patients to physicians, no matter
whether the physicians are treating or merely diagnosing.

177

See supra part IV. A.

